1L cases: what the Court held

The cards

1. Pennoyer v. Neff95 U.S. 714 (Oct. Term 1877)Civil procedureA personal judgment is without any validity, if it be rendered by a State court in an action upon a money-demand against a non-resident of the State, who was served by a publication of summons, but upon whom no personal service of process within the State was made, and who did not appear; and no title to property passes by a sale under an execution issued upon such a judgment.
2. Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins304 U.S. 64 (1938)Civil procedureA federal court exercising jurisdiction over such a case on the ground of diversity of citizenship, is not free to treat this question as one of so-called "general law," but must apply the state law as declared by the highest state court.
3. International Shoe Co. v. Washington326 U.S. 310 (1945)Civil procedureThe activities in question established between the State and the corporation sufficient contacts or ties to make it reasonable and just, and in conformity to the due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment, for the State to enforce against the corporation an obligation arising out of such activities.
   Facts

   Activities within a State of salesmen in the employ of a foreign corporation, exhibiting samples of merchandise and soliciting orders from prospective buyers to be accepted or rejected by the corporation at a point outside the State, were systematic and continuous, and resulted in a large volume of interstate business. A statute of the State requires employers to pay into the state unemployment compensation fund a specified percentage of the wages paid for the services of employees within the State.
4. Hanna v. Plumer380 U.S. 460 (1965)Civil procedureIn a civil action in a federal court where jurisdiction is based upon diversity of citizenship, service of process shall be made in the manner set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4 (d) (1) rather than in the manner prescribed by state law.
5. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson444 U.S. 286 (1980)Civil procedureConsistently with the Due Process Clause, the Oklahoma trial court may not exercise in personam jurisdiction over petitioners.
   Facts

   A products-liability action was instituted in an Oklahoma state court by respondents husband and wife to recover for personal injuries sustained in Oklahoma in an accident involving an automobile that had been purchased by them in New York while they were New York residents and that was being driven through Oklahoma at the time of the accident. The defendants included the automobile retailer and its wholesaler (petitioners), New York corporations that did no business in Oklahoma. Petitioners entered special appearances, claiming that Oklahoma's exercise of jurisdiction over them would offend limitations on the State's jurisdiction imposed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The trial court rejected petitioners' claims, and they then sought, but were denied, a writ of prohibition in the Oklahoma Supreme Court to restrain respondent trial judge from exercising in personam jurisdiction over them.
6. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett477 U.S. 317 (1986)Civil procedureThe plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.
   Facts

   In September 1980, respondent administratrix filed this wrongful-death action in Federal District Court, alleging that her husband's death in 1979 resulted from his exposure to asbestos products manufactured or distributed by the defendants, who included petitioner corporation. In September 1981, petitioner filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that during discovery respondent failed to produce any evidence to support her allegation that the decedent had been exposed to petitioner's products. In response, respondent produced documents tending to show such exposure, but petitioner argued that the documents were inadmissible hearsay and thus could not be considered in opposition to the summary judgment motion. In July 1982, the court granted the motion because there was no showing of exposure to petitioner's products, but the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that summary judgment in petitioner's favor was precluded because of petitioner's failure to support its motion with evidence tending to negate such exposure, as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e) and the decision in Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U. S. 144.
7. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly550 U.S. 544 (2007)Civil procedureStating a § 1 claim requires a complaint with enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest that an agreement was made.
8. Ashcroft v. Iqbal556 U.S. 662 (2009)Civil procedureIqbal’s complaint fails to plead sufficient facts to state a claim for purposeful and unlawful discrimination.
   Facts

   Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, respondent Iqbal, a Pakistani Muslim, was arrested on criminal charges and detained by federal officials under restrictive conditions. Iqbal filed a Bivens action against numerous federal officials, including petitioner Ashcroft, the former Attorney General, and petitioner Mueller, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). See Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388. The complaint alleged, inter alia, that petitioners designated Iqbal a person “of high interest” on account of his race, religion, or national origin, in contravention of the First and Fifth Amendments; that the FBI, under Mueller’s direction, arrested and detained thousands of Arab Muslim men as part of its September 11 investigation; that petitioners knew of, condoned, and willfully and maliciously agreed to subject Iqbal to harsh conditions of confinement as a matter of policy, solely on account of the prohibited factors and for no legitimate penological interest; and that Ashcroft was the policy’s “principal architect” and Mueller was “instrumental” in its adoption and execution. After the District Court denied petitioners’ motion to dismiss on qualified-immunity grounds, they invoked the collateral-order doctrine to file an interlocutory appeal in the Second Circuit. Affirming, that court assumed without discussion that it had jurisdiction and focused on the standard set forth in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U. S. 544, for evaluating whether a complaint is sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. Concluding that Twombly’s “flexible plausibility standard” obliging a pleader to amplify a claim with factual allegations where necessary to render it plausible was inapplicable in the context of petitioners’ appeal, the court held that Iqbal’s complaint was adequate to allege petitioners’ personal involvement in discriminatory decisions which, if true, violated clearly established constitutional law.
9. McCulloch v. Maryland17 U.S. 316 (1819)Constitutional lawCongress has power to incorporate a Bank.
10. Wickard v. Filburn317 U.S. 111 (1942)Constitutional lawThat the production of wheat for consumption on the farm may be trivial in the particular case is not enough to remove the grower from the scope of federal regulation, where his contribution, taken with that of many others similarly situated, is far from trivial.
11. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer343 U.S. 579 (1952)Constitutional lawThe Executive Order was not authorized by the Constitution or laws of the United States; and it cannot stand.
12. Brown v. Board of Education347 U.S. 483 (1954)Constitutional lawThe "separate but equal" doctrine adopted in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537, has no place in the field of public education.

Corrections

• 17 October 2026 · Pennoyer v. NeffWas “Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877)”, now “Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (Oct. Term 1877)”.The report prints the court's term, not the day of decision, so the year now reads as the term.
• 17 October 2026 · All 14 cardsWas “A flashcard, with the name, citation and year on the front and the holding on the back”, now “A case card, with the name, citation and year, the holding, and the facts where the syllabus states them”.A case card is studied both ways, from its name and from its facts. Every word on the cards is the report's, as before.